 9bdcbe0447
			
		
	
	9bdcbe0447
	
	
	
		
			
			Major integrations and fixes: - Added BACKBEAT SDK integration for P2P operation timing - Implemented beat-aware status tracking for distributed operations - Added Docker secrets support for secure license management - Resolved KACHING license validation via HTTPS/TLS - Updated docker-compose configuration for clean stack deployment - Disabled rollback policies to prevent deployment failures - Added license credential storage (CHORUS-DEV-MULTI-001) Technical improvements: - BACKBEAT P2P operation tracking with phase management - Enhanced configuration system with file-based secrets - Improved error handling for license validation - Clean separation of KACHING and CHORUS deployment stacks 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			692 lines
		
	
	
		
			25 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			692 lines
		
	
	
		
			25 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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| // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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| 
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| package qtls
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| 
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| import (
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| 	"crypto"
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| 	"crypto/aes"
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| 	"crypto/cipher"
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| 	"crypto/des"
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| 	"crypto/hmac"
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| 	"crypto/rc4"
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| 	"crypto/sha1"
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| 	"crypto/sha256"
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| 	"fmt"
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| 	"hash"
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| 	"runtime"
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| 
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| 	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
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| 	"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
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| )
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| 
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| // CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package
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| // accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type.
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| type CipherSuite struct {
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| 	ID   uint16
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| 	Name string
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| 
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| 	// Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can
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| 	// negotiate this cipher suite.
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| 	SupportedVersions []uint16
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| 
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| 	// Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues
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| 	// due to its primitives, design, or implementation.
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| 	Insecure bool
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| }
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| 
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| var (
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| 	supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12}
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| 	supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12}
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| 	supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13}
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| )
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| 
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| // CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
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| // package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
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| // InsecureCipherSuites.
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| //
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| // The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by
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| // this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list,
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| // and might not match those returned by this function.
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| func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
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| 	return []*CipherSuite{
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| 		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 
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| 		{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
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| 		{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
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| 		{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
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| 
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| // InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
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| // this package and which have security issues.
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| //
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| // Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should
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| // only use those returned by CipherSuites.
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| func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
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| 	// This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See
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| 	// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details.
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| 	return []*CipherSuite{
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| 		{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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| 		{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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| 		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
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| 		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| // CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID
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| // (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation
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| // of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package.
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| func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string {
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| 	for _, c := range CipherSuites() {
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| 		if c.ID == id {
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| 			return c.Name
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| 		}
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| 	}
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| 	for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() {
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| 		if c.ID == id {
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| 			return c.Name
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| 		}
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| 	}
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| 	return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id)
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| }
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| 
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| const (
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| 	// suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
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| 	// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
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| 	// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
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| 	// that we're happy with.
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| 	suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
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| 	// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
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| 	// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
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| 	// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
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| 	// is RSA based.
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| 	suiteECSign
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| 	// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
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| 	// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
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| 	suiteTLS12
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| 	// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
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| 	// handshake hash.
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| 	suiteSHA384
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| )
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| 
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| // A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange
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| // mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD.
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| type cipherSuite struct {
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| 	id uint16
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| 	// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
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| 	keyLen int
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| 	macLen int
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| 	ivLen  int
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| 	ka     func(version uint16) keyAgreement
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| 	// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
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| 	flags  int
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| 	cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
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| 	mac    func(key []byte) hash.Hash
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| 	aead   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
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| }
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| 
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| var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter.
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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| 	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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| 	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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| 	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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| 	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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| }
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| 
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| // selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which
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| // is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter.
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| func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite {
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| 	for _, id := range ids {
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| 		candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
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| 		if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) {
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| 			continue
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| 		}
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| 
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| 		for _, suppID := range supportedIDs {
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| 			if id == suppID {
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| 				return candidate
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| 			}
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| 		}
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| 	}
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| 	return nil
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| }
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| 
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| // A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
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| // algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
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| type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
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| 	id     uint16
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| 	keyLen int
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| 	aead   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
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| 	hash   crypto.Hash
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| }
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| 
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| var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
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| 	{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
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| 	{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
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| 	{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
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| }
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| 
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| // cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the
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| // server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites.
 | ||
| //
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| // Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and
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| // peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if
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| // any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker
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| // cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last
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| // word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection.
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| //
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| // The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the
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| // first (most important) applicable one:
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| //
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| //   - Anything else comes before RC4
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| //
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| //     RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
 | ||
| //
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| //   - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
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| //
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| //     SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
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| //     countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
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| //     https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
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| //
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| //   - Anything else comes before 3DES
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| //
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| //     3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
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| //     birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
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| //
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| //   - ECDHE comes before anything else
 | ||
| //
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| //     Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
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| //     property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
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| //     implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
 | ||
| //
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| //   - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
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| //
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| //     Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
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| //     are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
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| //     padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
 | ||
| //     https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
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| //     https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
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| //
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| //   - AES comes before ChaCha20
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| //
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| //     When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
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| //     than ChaCha20Poly1305.
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| //
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| //     When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
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| //     slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
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| //     than ChaCha20Poly1305.
 | ||
| //
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| //     We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
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| //     cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
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| //
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| //   - AES-128 comes before AES-256
 | ||
| //
 | ||
| //     The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
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| //     margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
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| //     TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
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| //     contribute to the advantages above).
 | ||
| //
 | ||
| //   - ECDSA comes before RSA
 | ||
| //
 | ||
| //     The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
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| //     as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
 | ||
| var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
 | ||
| 	// AEADs w/ ECDHE
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
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| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
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| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
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| 
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| 	// CBC w/ ECDHE
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| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
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| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
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| 
 | ||
| 	// AEADs w/o ECDHE
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| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
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| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
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| 
 | ||
| 	// CBC w/o ECDHE
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
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| 
 | ||
| 	// 3DES
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| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
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| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// CBC_SHA256
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// RC4
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{
 | ||
| 	// ChaCha20Poly1305
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// AES-GCM w/ ECDHE
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in
 | ||
| // Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
 | ||
| var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{
 | ||
| 	// CBC_SHA256
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// RC4
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| var (
 | ||
| 	defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites)
 | ||
| 	defaultCipherSuites    = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen]
 | ||
| )
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no
 | ||
| // disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as
 | ||
| // cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies.
 | ||
| var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 | ||
| 	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{
 | ||
| 	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| var (
 | ||
| 	hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
 | ||
| 	hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
 | ||
| 	// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
 | ||
| 	hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR &&
 | ||
| 		(cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 ||
 | ||
| 		runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 ||
 | ||
| 		runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X
 | ||
| )
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
 | ||
| 	// TLS 1.2
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:   true,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:   true,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
 | ||
| 	// TLS 1.3
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
 | ||
| 	// TLS 1.2
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:   true,
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
 | ||
| 	// TLS 1.3
 | ||
| 	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true,
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list
 | ||
| // is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it.
 | ||
| func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
 | ||
| 	for _, cID := range ciphers {
 | ||
| 		if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil {
 | ||
| 			return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
 | ||
| 		}
 | ||
| 		if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil {
 | ||
| 			return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
 | ||
| 		}
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return false
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
 | ||
| 	cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
 | ||
| 	return cipher
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
 | ||
| 	block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
 | ||
| 	if isRead {
 | ||
| 		return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
 | ||
| 	block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
 | ||
| 	if isRead {
 | ||
| 		return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC.
 | ||
| func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 | ||
| 	h := sha1.New
 | ||
| 	h = newConstantTimeHash(h)
 | ||
| 	return hmac.New(h, key)
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and
 | ||
| // is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites.
 | ||
| func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash {
 | ||
| 	return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| type aead interface {
 | ||
| 	cipher.AEAD
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
 | ||
| 	// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
 | ||
| 	// zero for modern ones.
 | ||
| 	explicitNonceLen() int
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| const (
 | ||
| 	aeadNonceLength   = 12
 | ||
| 	noncePrefixLength = 4
 | ||
| )
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
 | ||
| // each call.
 | ||
| type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
 | ||
| 	// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
 | ||
| 	nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
 | ||
| 	aead  cipher.AEAD
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int        { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
 | ||
| func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int         { return f.aead.Overhead() }
 | ||
| func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
 | ||
| 	copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
 | ||
| 	return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
 | ||
| 	copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
 | ||
| 	return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // xorNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
 | ||
| // before each call.
 | ||
| type xorNonceAEAD struct {
 | ||
| 	nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
 | ||
| 	aead      cipher.AEAD
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int        { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
 | ||
| func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int         { return f.aead.Overhead() }
 | ||
| func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
 | ||
| 	for i, b := range nonce {
 | ||
| 		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
 | ||
| 	for i, b := range nonce {
 | ||
| 		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	return result
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
 | ||
| 	for i, b := range nonce {
 | ||
| 		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
 | ||
| 	for i, b := range nonce {
 | ||
| 		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	return result, err
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
 | ||
| 	if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
 | ||
| 		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
 | ||
| 	if err != nil {
 | ||
| 		panic(err)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	var aead cipher.AEAD
 | ||
| 	aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
 | ||
| 	if err != nil {
 | ||
| 		panic(err)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
 | ||
| 	copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
 | ||
| 	return ret
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
 | ||
| 	if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
 | ||
| 		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
 | ||
| 	if err != nil {
 | ||
| 		panic(err)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
 | ||
| 	if err != nil {
 | ||
| 		panic(err)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
 | ||
| 	copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
 | ||
| 	return ret
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
 | ||
| 	if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
 | ||
| 		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
 | ||
| 	if err != nil {
 | ||
| 		panic(err)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
 | ||
| 	copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
 | ||
| 	return ret
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| type constantTimeHash interface {
 | ||
| 	hash.Hash
 | ||
| 	ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
 | ||
| // with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
 | ||
| type cthWrapper struct {
 | ||
| 	h constantTimeHash
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int                   { return c.h.Size() }
 | ||
| func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int              { return c.h.BlockSize() }
 | ||
| func (c *cthWrapper) Reset()                      { c.h.Reset() }
 | ||
| func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
 | ||
| func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte         { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
 | ||
| 	return func() hash.Hash {
 | ||
| 		return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
 | ||
| func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
 | ||
| 	h.Reset()
 | ||
| 	h.Write(seq)
 | ||
| 	h.Write(header)
 | ||
| 	h.Write(data)
 | ||
| 	res := h.Sum(out)
 | ||
| 	if extra != nil {
 | ||
| 		h.Write(extra)
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return res
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
 | ||
| 	return rsaKeyAgreement{}
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
 | ||
| 	return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
 | ||
| 		isRSA:   false,
 | ||
| 		version: version,
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
 | ||
| 	return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
 | ||
| 		isRSA:   true,
 | ||
| 		version: version,
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
 | ||
| // ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
 | ||
| func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
 | ||
| 	for _, id := range have {
 | ||
| 		if id == want {
 | ||
| 			return cipherSuiteByID(id)
 | ||
| 		}
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return nil
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
 | ||
| 	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
 | ||
| 		if cipherSuite.id == id {
 | ||
| 			return cipherSuite
 | ||
| 		}
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return nil
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
 | ||
| 	for _, id := range have {
 | ||
| 		if id == want {
 | ||
| 			return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
 | ||
| 		}
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return nil
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
 | ||
| 	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
 | ||
| 		if cipherSuite.id == id {
 | ||
| 			return cipherSuite
 | ||
| 		}
 | ||
| 	}
 | ||
| 	return nil
 | ||
| }
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| // A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
 | ||
| // package.
 | ||
| //
 | ||
| // See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
 | ||
| const (
 | ||
| 	// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                      uint16 = 0x0005
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA                 uint16 = 0x000a
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                  uint16 = 0x002f
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                  uint16 = 0x0035
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256               uint16 = 0x003c
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               uint16 = 0x009c
 | ||
| 	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               uint16 = 0x009d
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              uint16 = 0xc007
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xc009
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xc00a
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                uint16 = 0xc011
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xc012
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xc013
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xc014
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0xc023
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xc027
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xc02f
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0xc02b
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xc030
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0xc02c
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256   uint16 = 0xcca8
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0x1301
 | ||
| 	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0x1302
 | ||
| 	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
 | ||
| 	// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
 | ||
| 	TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
 | ||
| 
 | ||
| 	// Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256
 | ||
| 	// suffix, retained for backward compatibility.
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305   = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 | ||
| 	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 | ||
| )
 |